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Highlights 
 
 We look at the capital-liquidity-lending relationship in European banks 
 The effect of bank capital on lending depends on the level of bank liquidity 
 Capital exerts a positive effect on lending after banks retain sufficient liquid funds 
 The results are robust to different measures of lending, capital and liquidity.  
 Capital and liquidity are complementary for European banks. 




Liquidity and capital in bank lending: evidence from European banks* 
By 
John Thornton 
Office of Technical Assistance, United States Department of the Treasury, 1750 Pennsylvania 
Ave NW, Washington DC 20006, USA; Email: john.thornton@otatreas.us,  
and  
Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich NR4 
7TJ, UK. Email: John.Thornton@uea.ac.uk (Corresponding author). 
and 
 Caterina di Tommaso 





We examine whether the effect of bank capital on credit growth differs depending upon the level 
of liquidity in a panel of up to 521 banks from 21 European countries. We find that the effect of 
an increase in bank capital is positively associated with the level of bank liquidity, suggesting 
that capital exerts a significantly positive effect on European banks‘ credit growth after they 
retain sufficient liquid funds. 
JEL classification: G01, G21 





The 2007–2009 financial crisis led to widespread support for the use of enhanced capital and 
liquidity requirements as policy tools and both have featured prominently in recent regulatory 
reforms. However, debate on the likely effects of the higher capital requirements in particular on 
bank lending has been heated, with a key issue being whether frictions in the market for bank 
equity (e.g., tax deductibility of debt interest payments, asymmetric information, debt overhang) 
undermine the Modigliani–Miller view that changes in the composition of banks‘ liabilities 
should not affect the overall funding cost and hence the volume and structure of banks‘ assets.
1
 
Empirical studies on the relationship between bank capital and lending have had mixed results 
with higher capital requirements having been found to reduce lending (Francis and Osborne, 
2009; Aiyar et al., 2014; Bridges et al., 2014), to have no little or effect on lending (Ediz et al., 
1998), or to be associated with an increase in lending (Berrospide and Edge, 2010; Buch and 
Prieto, 2014; Altunbas et al., 2016). A recent thread of the bank reform-related literature has 
stressed that the impact of higher capital ratios on lending may depend on developments in other 
bank characteristics, especially the level of bank liquidity. For example, Acharya and Schnabl 
(2010), Chava and Purnandam (2011) and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) report evidence that 
                                               
1 In particular, a main argument that banks deploy against higher equity requirements is that equity is a costly form 
of funding that results in a reduction in bank lending. For example, in the context of the post-2007-2009 regulatory 
debate, the Institute for International Finance—a lobby group for the major international banks—asserted that 
additional capital requirements for its members could result in 3.2% lower output by 2015 in these economies than 




during the recent crisis foreign subsidiaries of US banks reduced their lending compared to 
domestic banks when parent banks experienced liquidity problems. Cornett et al. (2011) and 
Berrospide (2013) report that efforts of US banks to manage liquidity caused bank lending to 
decline during the recent crisis. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that the growth of lending 
by US banks falls more substantially for banks with less access to deposit financing. Kim and 
Sohn (2017) report that credit growth by US banks is positively associated with the level of bank 
liquidity in the case of large banks, and Khan et al. (2017) report that US banks having lower 
funding liquidity risk take more risk and thus are more inclined to lend. In this paper, we add to 
this thread but switch the focus to the behavior of European banks. Specifically, we examine 
whether the effect of bank capital on lending differs depending on the level of bank liquidity 
employing a panel of up to 521 banks from 21 European countries over the period 2007-2017. 
Our main finding is that there is a significant interaction effect of bank capital and liquidity on 
bank lending and the supply of credit more generally by European banks. Both bank capital and 
liquidity are needed to sustain bank lending, with capital exerting a significantly positive effect 
on lending after banks retain sufficient liquid funds. This result is broadly in line with the 
findings of recent studies of the role of liquidity in lending by US banks discussed above. The 
results are also consistent with recent theoretical research (e.g., Carletti et al., 2018; Vives, 2014; 
Schilling, 2016; Calomiris et al., 2015) suggesting that bank regulation for purpose of financial 
stability be designed in a way that considers both sides of banks‘ balance sheet. 
2. Model and data 
We test the hypothesis that the relationship between bank capital and lending depends on the 
level of bank liquidity by estimating the following panel regression: 
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                                                          (1) 
In equation (1),      is the lending of bank i in period t,         is a measure of bank capital, 
          is a measure of bank liquidity,                   is the interaction of bank capital 
and liquidity,   is a vector of other bank-specific characteristics, and      and 
             are the quarterly growth rate real GDP and the quarterly change in the central bank 
policy interest rate, respectively.        is a 0-1 dummy variable equal to 1 during 2007Q3 to 
2009Q2 to capture the worst effects of the financial crisis, and    and    are bank and time fixed 
effects, respectively. In the panel estimates, capital, liquidity and the other bank-specific 
variables are lagged one period to mitigate possible endogeneity bias. 
 
For robustness, we estimate equation (1) employing alternative measures of bank lending, capital 
and liquidity. We employ two measures of bank lending: a broad bank ‗credit‘ measure, which is 
the quarterly real rate of growth of net loans and advances plus unused credit commitments, and 
a narrower definition, which is the quarterly real rate of growth of net loans and advances only. 
We distinguish between the two measures because drawdowns on existing credit commitments 
increase total bank credit and reduce bank liquidity without new loans being granted (Ivashina 
and Scharfstein, 2010; Kim and Sohn, 2017). We employ three measures of bank capital: the 
ratio of tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets, which is the regulator‘s measure of the core strength 
of a financial institution; the ratio of tier 1 plus tier 2 capital to risk weighted assets, which 
measures total regulatory capital, and the ratio of equity capital to total assets because banks 
have considerable discretion over the assignment of risk weights, and hence over the risks they 
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banks take (Admati and Hellwig, 2013). Finally, we employ two measures of bank liquidity. The 
first is the commonly used ratio of liquid assets (cash and balances with central bank, due from 
other financial institutions, trading securities, available-for-sale securities, other securities, and 
unearned income from securities) to total assets, and a more restrictive measure, which is the 
ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding because liquidity strains are more likely 
to arise from the liabilities side of the balance sheet from the withdrawal of funds from wholesale 
deposits and the loss of other sources of short-term financing (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012; Cornett 
et al., 2011).  
 
We include six other bank-specific variables in the vector     that are commonly used in the 
banking literature, but whose effects often do not have a strong theoretical foundation. The first 
variable is bank size, measured as the logarithm of total assets,     . Large banks may have 
incentives to take more risk if there is a high expectation of a government bailout to prevent 
systemic risk (Afonso et al., 2014). However, risk may also decline for large banks because they 
are better able to diversify their portfolio, whereas small banks tend to pursue traditional banking 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). The second variable is market funding,     , measured 
as the ratio of non-deposit liabilities to total assets and where banks with a higher ratio of 
customer deposits to total liabilities might have a lower default risk because they have a more 
stable source of funding, particularly during periods of crises (Shleifer and Vishny, 2010). The 
third variable is the ratio of unused loan commitments to total assets,            , which is 
expected to impact positively on the growth of net loans and advances (Cornett et al., 2011) but 
where banks exposed to a higher level of commitments are likely to be less willing to expand 
total credit (loans plus unused commitments) (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Kim and Sohn, 
 7 
2017). Our fourth bank-specific variable is the return on assets,       , which is measured as the 
ratio of net income to total assets. According to the ―pecking order theory of finance‖, because 
increasing extra capital is costly, it may be easier to accumulate capital via higher retained 
earnings (Flannery and Rangan, 2008). In contrast, greater profitability might also make capital 
requirements less binding so that banks are less averse to occasional losses through risk-taking 
(Calem and Rob, 1999; Perotti et al., 2011). The final two bank-specific variables capture the 
quality of bank assets and are the ratio of impaired loans to total loans,      and the ratio of 
loan loss provisions to total gross loans,           ; the impact of both variables is generally 
expected to be negative because they limit banks‘ lending ability (Kim and Sohn, 2017). 
However, Angelini (2018) points out that this is probably only the case if the bank is perceived 
as weak and relatively risky, in which case it may experience difficulties accessing liquidity and 
capital markets that could be reflected in a bank‘s lending supply. However, these channels may 
be dampened, or neutralized altogether, if the bank is sufficiently profitable and/or 
capitalized. Moreover, weak balance sheets could in principle induce banks to lend more, rather 
than less, following a ‗gamble for resurrection‘ logic. The empirical evidence on NPLs in this 
regard is scant but a recent study by Accornero et al. (2017) of the influence of NPLs on the 
supply of bank credit to non-financial firms in Italy finds that, NPL ratios per se have no impact 
on the banks‘ lending behaviour. Finally, real GDP growth,      and the change in the central 
bank policy interest rate,              are included to capture the effects on bank lending of the 
business cycle and changes in monetary policy. The expected sign of the growth rate of real GDP 
is positive because of the procyclicality of bank lending and increased loan demands, and the 
effect of changes in the policy interest rate could be negative if increases in market rates reduce 
loan demands, or positive if monetary policy is procyclical.  
 8 
Our primary source of data for the bank-specific variables is BankScope, which provides us with 
balance sheet data for 521 banks from 21 European countries over the period 2007Q1 to 2017Q4. 
The GDP and policy interest rate data are from central banks‘ online statistical databases. 
Variable definitions and their summary statistics are presented in Table 1. 
 
3. Empirical results 
 
We present baseline panel regression results in Table 2. Columns 1 to 3 of the table report results 
for the three definitions of capital when the dependent variable is net loans plus unused loan 
commitments. The results are consistent across the three definitions of capital: the coefficients 
are positive and statistically significant and suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in the 
capital ratio is associated with a quarterly growth rate in real lending of between 0.01-0.13 
percentage points, depending upon the definition of capital used. Columns 4 to 6 of the table 
report results when the dependent variable is net loans and advances. The coefficients on the 
three capital ratio are also positive and statistically significant and suggest that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the capital ratio is associated with a quarterly growth rate in real lending of 
between 0.04-0.49 percentage points. Banks appear to be least constrained by the total regulatory 
capital ratio (tier 1 plus tier 2) in expanding their lending, and less constrained by the regulatory 
ratios when they expand total credit. The coefficients on the other bank-specific variables 
suggest that banks are more likely to expand credit and net lending when they are liquid, have 
access to market funding, and are profitable, and less likely to lend if they are large. Unused loan 
commitments impact positively on loan growth but negatively on credit growth indicating that 
banks exposed to a higher level of commitments are likely to be less willing to expand total 
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credit; in contrast, the quality of existing assets (nonperforming loans and loan provisions) has 
uncertain effects on credit and lending. The coefficients on real GDP growth and the central bank 
policy rate suggest that credit,  lending and monetary policy are procyclical. Finally, the 
coefficient on the crisis dummy is negative and statistically significant, capturing the crisis-
induced reduction in credit and lending. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 report results for credit and lending, respectively, when the regressions include 
interaction terms. In these results, the coefficients on capital and liquidity reflect the conditional 
effects of these variables on the growth of credit and lending. In columns 1, 3 and 5 of both 
tables the interaction is between bank liquidity and the three definitions of bank capital. The 
interaction term (capital*liquidity) is always positive and statistically significant—i.e., the effect 
of bank capital on credit and lending is positively associated with the level of liquidity. A one 
standard deviation increase in the liquidity ratio raises the effects of a 1 percentage point increase 
in the capital ratio on credit growth by between 0.09 to 11.82 percentage points in a quarter, 
depending upon the definition of capital (Table 3),
2
 and raises the effects of a 1 percentage point 
increase in the capital ratio on net loan growth by between 1.03 to 9.29 percentage points in a 
quarter, depending on the definition of capital (Table 4). In columns 2 4 and 6 of tables 3 and 4 
we report results that also include the interaction of bank capital and liquidity with the crisis 
dummy. The important points here are that the crisis had a negligible impact on the role of bank 
capital in supporting lending (the coefficients on the capital*crisis interaction term are positive 
but generally not significant), a negative impact on bank liquidity (the coefficients on the 
liquidity*crisis interaction term are statistically significant and negative and are larger the 
                                               
2 For example, in column 1 of Table 3: 0.09=0.015(coefficient on the interaction term)*19.069(the standard 
deviation on the liquidity ratio reported in Table 1). 
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coefficient on bank liquidity), but that the effect of bank capital on credit and lending remains 
positively associated with the level of liquidity overall (i.e., the coefficient on the 
capital*liquidity*crisis interaction terms remained positive and generally statistically 
significant). In these cases, a one standard deviation increase in the liquidity ratio raises the 
effects of a 1 percentage point increase in the capital ratio on credit growth by 0.00 to 2.59 
percentage points in a quarter (Table 3) and on net loan growth by between 0.00 to 11.04 
percentage points in a quarter (Table 4). In all of the regressions, the outcomes for other bank-
specific variable, GDP and the policy interest rates are broadly as in the baseline results.  
 
For additional robustness, in Tables 5 and 6 we report results for credit and lending, respectively, 
when the regressions include the interaction terms but where bank liquidity is defined as the ratio 
of liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding. The main conclusions from the earlier results 
hold—i.e., the effect of bank capital on credit and lending is positively associated with the level 
of bank liquidity, including in the crisis. Not surprising, the narrower definition of liquidity 
enhances it effect in elevating the impact of capital on bank credit and lending. For example, a 
one standard deviation increase in the liquidity ratio raises the effects of a 1 percentage point 
increase in the capital ratio on credit growth by 9.36 to 14.96 percentage points in a quarter, 




We examined whether the effect of bank capital on the growth of credit and lending by European 
bank differs depending upon the level of bank liquidity. We find that an increase in bank capital 
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is positively associated with the level of bank liquidity, suggesting that capital exerts a 
significantly positive effect on European banks‘ credit and lending growth after they retain 
sufficient liquid funds. The results are robust to different measures of bank lending, capital and 
liquidity. They suggest that bank capital and liquidity are complementary for European banks 
and, as such, policy actions that change both capital and liquidity requirements or inject official 
resources to strengthen capital and liquidity, should be considered together if the objective is to 
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Table 1.  
Variable definitions and summary statistics 
Variable Description Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Loan Quarterly real growth rate of net loans and unused commitments, or 1.003 1.014 0.219 1.818 0.204 
 quarterly real growth rate of net loans 1.360 0.544 2.023 0.069 14.443 
Capital Ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets, or 12.069 12.569 2.402 0.384 18.244 
 ratio of equity to risk weighted assets, or 19.285 17.333 0.087 34.700 1.111 
 ratio of equity to total assets 12.739 8.979 14.106 39.190 0.000 
Liquidity Ratio of liquid assets (cash and balances with central bank, due from 
other financial institutions, trading securities, available-for-sale 
securities, other securities, and unearned income from securities) to 
total assets, or  
22.024 16.239 19.069 59.508 0.000 
 ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding 19.688 20.190 16.106 49.124 0.000 
Size Logarithm of total assets 16.027 16.092 2.216 22.004 8.438 
Funding Ratio of non-deposit liabilities to total assets 34.743 30.804 2.437 57.481 0.879 
Commitments Ratio of unused commitments to total assets 8.420 6.564 9.700 67.972 0.000 
Profit Ratio of net income to total average assets 0.724 0.462 3.346 27.203 0.162 
NPLs Ratio of impaired loans to total loans 3.088 3.046 0.112 5.321 0.000 
Provisions Ratio of loan loss provisions to total average gross loans 1.202 0.407 3.600 4.583 0.102 
GDP Average quarterly growth rate of real GDP 0.471 0.469 5.260 5.600 -0.350 
Policy rate Change in quarterly average central bank policy rate  -0.031 0.000 0.176 4.500 -2.000 
Crisis  Dummy variable equal to 1 2007Q3 to 2009Q2 and 0 otherwise      
Countries   Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Croatia, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, and Slovakia 
Notes: The sample period is 2007Q1 to 2017Q4. All bank-specific variables are from BankScope. Data for real GDP and the central bank policy 












Table 2.  
Capital, liquidity, credit and lending growth by European banks: baseline results 
 
Credit=net loans and advances plus 
unused commitments 
 Lending=net loans and advances 
 Tier 1/RWA Equity/RWA 
Equity/total 
assets 
 Tier 1/RWA Equity/RWA 
Equity/total 
assets 
 1 2 3  4 5 6 






















































































































































































Observations 0.123 0.134 0.251  0.112 0.193 0.251 
R-squared 16210 17610 20639  11609 16191 13587 
No. of panels 377 411 480  270 356 316 
Notes: Estimates are unbalanced panel regressions with bank and time fixed effects. Credit is defined as the 
quarterly real rate of growth of net bank loans and advances plus unused credit commitments. Loans are 
defined as the quarterly real rate of growth of net bank loans and advances.***, **, and * indicate statistical 











Table 3.   
Capital, liquidity and credit growth (net loans and advances plus unused commitments) by European 
banks with interaction terms 
 Tier 1 capital/RWA Equity/RWA Equity/total assets 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Loant-1 




















































































































































































































R2 0.127 0.129 0.178 0.152 0.231 0.244 
Observations 16210 16210 17610 17610 20639 20639 
No. of panels 377 377 411 411 480 480 
Notes: Estimates are unbalanced panel regressions with bank and time fixed effects. Credit is defined as 
the quarterly real rate of growth of net bank loans and advances plus unused credit commitments. ***, 






Capital, liquidity and lending growth (net loans and advances) by European banks with interaction terms 
 



























































































































































































































R2 0.124 0.145 0.178 0.216 0.231 0.202 
Observations 11609 11609 16191 16191 13587 13587 
Number of ID 270 270 356 356 316 316 
Notes: Estimates are unbalanced panel regressions with bank and time fixed effects. Lending is defined as 
the quarterly real rate of growth of net bank loans and advances. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 





Table 5.  
Capital, liquidity and credit growth (net loans and advances plus unused commitments) by European banks: 
interaction terms and alternative liquidity definition 
 Tier 1 capital/risk 
weighted assets 
Equity/risk weighted assets Equity/total assets 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 










































Liquidityt-1* Crisis  -0.205*** 
(0.054) 


















  0.875*** 
(0.260) 


























































































































R2   0.156   0.193   0.211   0.219   0.204  0.225 
Observations  16081  16081  17610  17610 20467 17610 
Number of ID   374   374   411   411   476   177 
Notes: Estimates are unbalanced panel regressions with bank and time fixed effects. Credit is defined as the 
quarterly real rate of growth of net bank loans and advances plus unused credit commitments. Liquidity is defined 
as the ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 




Table 6.  
Capital, liquidity and lending growth (net loans and advances) by European banks: interaction terms and 
alternative liquidity definition 
 Tier 1 capital/risk weighted 
assets 
Equity/risk-weighted assets Equity/total assets 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
























Capitalt-1* Crisis    1.250 
(0.976) 








































  0.554*** 
(0.174) 


























































































































R2   0.165   0.192   0.210   0.219   0.214  0.219 
Observations  11050  11050  16062  16062 13415 13415 
Number of panels   257   257   350   350   312   312 
Notes: Estimates are unbalanced panel regressions with bank and time fixed effects. Lending is defined as the 
quarterly real rate of growth of net bank loans and advances. Liquidity is defined as the ratio of liquid assets to 
deposits and short-term funding. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
